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here is widespread agreement that price
stability (in practice, low and stable inflation)
should be an objective of monetary policy.
This agreement is reflected both in the mandates
set for monetary policy by governments and in the
practice of central banks. Several other important
questions about the objectives for monetary policy
are less settled: Should there be other objectives?
If there are multiple objectives, should one of the
objectives take priority? And how explicit should
the objectives be?
Central banks typically operate under one of two
types of mandate. A hierarchical mandate makes
price stability the primary objective for monetary
policy and subordinates other potential objectives.
A dual mandate recognizes two objectives—price
stability and full employment—and puts them on
an equal footing. Either regime could make the price
stability objective more precise by setting an explicit
numerical target for inflation. 
Thus we can describe a typical central bank’s
mandate and objectives in terms of two sets of
alternatives: between a hierarchical or a dual man-
date, on the one hand, and an implicit or explicit
inflation objective, on the other hand. During the
1990s, a number of central banks adopted a frame-
work that is called inflation targeting, combining
a hierarchical mandate and an explicit inflation
objective. The United States, in contrast, combines
a dual mandate and an implicit inflation objective.
Most of the discussion in the United States on
the subject of mandates and objectives has been
about whether to identify inflation as the single or
primary objective and whether to move to a formal
inflation-targeting regime.1 The title of my lecture—
“Inflation Targets and Inflation Targeting”—is
intended to differentiate between two options for
changing the policy mandate for the Federal Reserve.
One option, which I favor, is setting an explicit
numerical target for inflation within the context of
our current dual mandate. The other option, which I
do not favor, is moving to an inflation-targeting
regime—that is, also substituting a hierarchical
mandate for our current dual mandate. The purpose
of this lecture is therefore to explain the benefits
of an explicit inflation target in the context of the
Federal Reserve’s dual mandate and to set out the
operational steps for implementing such a target.
Before proceeding, let me note that the views
that I am presenting here are my own. I am not
speaking for the Board of Governors or the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC).
THE EVOLUTION OF MONETARY
POLICY MANDATES
A good starting point is a survey of mandates
around the world. I will begin by discussing the
evolution of the mandate in the United States,
including the precise language related to the dual
mandate, the way in which the price stability objec-
tive has been interpreted, and proposed legislation
that would have amended the mandate. Then I
sketch an inflation-targeting regime and discuss
some common elements and differences among
the inflation-targeting regimes of developed econ-
omies around the world.
The Evolution of Policy Objectives in
the United States
In the United States, it took quite some time for
the Congress to establish a precise set of objectives
for monetary policy. In fact, remarkably little about
policy objectives was included in the original Federal
Reserve Act in 1913. The only policy objectives of
the Fed, as identified in that statute, were “to furnish
an elastic currency [and] to afford means of redis-
counting commercial paper.” The absence of any
mention of price stability undoubtedly reflected
confidence that the gold standard, under which the
United States was operating, would promote price
stability. The intent of providing an elastic currency
and of rediscounting commercial paper was to
expand the supply of money and credit to accom-
modate expansions in production and the accom-
panying demand for credit. Given that the immediate
impetus of the founding of the Federal Reserve was
the Panic of 1907, promoting financial stability was
a clear focus. The framers’ intention was that the
Federal Reserve would provide banks with a source
of liquidity through rediscounting to meet deposit
withdrawals.
1 See, for example, Bernanke et al. (1999) and Gramlich (2000).
Laurence H. Meyer is a member of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. These remarks were originally presented at
the University of California at San Diego Economics Roundtable, San
Diego, California, July 17, 2001.
©2001, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUISOn several occasions during the 1920s and
1930s, the Congress debated a price-stability objec-
tive for the Fed. The Fed opposed such a mandate
and it was not adopted. Congress did take a step
toward a more explicit treatment of policy objectives
in the Employment Act of 1946. This act identified
the objectives for the government in general, but not
specifically for the Fed. Still, the act was generally
viewed as applying to the Fed, as a part of govern-
ment. The objectives identified in the act were “to
promote maximum employment, production, and
purchasing power.” Although this set of objectives
could be interpreted as including both full employ-
ment and price stability, the title of the bill and the
specific language suggests that the priority at the
time was more to maintain full employment than
to promote price stability. Such a focus on stabilizing
employment and a relative inattention to inflation
was perhaps an understandable reaction to the Great
Depression when, for a decade, high unemployment
and falling prices were the major problems facing
the U.S. economy. 
The specific mandate for the Federal Reserve
was first added to the Federal Reserve Act in 1977,
although that same language had been included in
a 1975 concurrent resolution of the Congress. The
1977 amendment required the Board of Governors
and the FOMC to “maintain the growth of monetary
and credit aggregates commensurate with the econ-
omy’s long-run potential to increase production,
so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term
interest rates.” This language makes the objective
of price stability explicit. Because the Fed can con-
tribute to moderate long-term interest rates princi-
pally by achieving low and stable inflation, that
objective is generally not viewed as an independent
one. In addition, the goal of maximum employment
is usually interpreted as maximum sustainable
employment—meaning the highest level of employ-
ment that can be maintained without upward
pressure on inflation. The mandate is therefore
interpreted as a dual mandate: full employment
and price stability.
The Federal Reserve has not set an explicit,
numerical objective for inflation. Paul Volcker offered
the following definition of price stability in 1983: 
A workable definition of reasonable “price
stability” would seem to me to be a situation
in which expectations of generally rising
(or falling) prices over a considerable period
are not a pervasive influence on economic
and financial behavior. Stated more posi-
tively, “stability” would imply that decision
making should be able to proceed on the
basis that “real” and “nominal” values are
substantially the same over the planning
horizon—and that planning horizons should
be suitably long.2
Alan Greenspan has described the price stabil-
ity objective in a similar way: “We will be at price
stability when households and businesses need not
factor expectations of changes in the average level
of prices into their decisions.”3
These definitions make clear a commitment
to low inflation. But they leave open whether, for
example, the inflation rate prevailing today—about
2.5 percent for the core consumer price index (CPI)
measure of consumer prices—is consistent with
this definition. Is policy going to be set to lower infla-
tion over time, and if so, by how much? These defi-
nitions also leave open the possibility of changing
interpretations as the FOMC membership changes
over time.
The Fed often prefers to state its objective with-
out specifically mentioning price stability. This is
perhaps because the emphasis on price stability is
taken by some as carrying a hint of restrictive policy
and as an inclination to always be leaning against
cyclical increases in demand. The Fed sometimes
prefers to state its objective simply as promoting
maximum sustainable growth. Stating its objective
in this way allows the Fed to offer a more positive
message and leaves implicit the price stability objec-
tive in two ways. First, if the economy were to grow
above a sustainable rate for long enough, overheat-
ing and higher inflation would eventually follow.
Second, price stability contributes to a high and
perhaps faster rate of growth in productive capacity,
a point I will return to below. Nevertheless, I prefer
to state the Fed’s objectives as full employment and
price stability. In my view, the Fed has no growth
objective. At full employment, the rate of growth
will automatically be the maximum sustainable
rate the economy is capable of achieving and a rate
largely independent of monetary policy, except
insofar as monetary policy is successful in achieving
price stability. 
In recent years, bills have been introduced on a




3 Greenspan (1994).the sole or primary objective for monetary policy
and required the Fed to set an explicit numerical
inflation target. In 1989, 1991, and 1993, Represent-
ative Steve Neal, Chairman of the House Banking
Committee’s Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary
Policy, introduced resolutions instructing the Federal
Reserve “to adopt and pursue monetary policies
leading to, and then maintaining, zero inflation.”
In the 1991 and 1993 versions, zero inflation was
defined as “when the expected rate of change of
the general level of prices ceases to be a factor in
individual and business decisionmaking.” While
these resolutions did not pass, the definition of
price stability in the 1991 and 1993 resolutions was,
undoubtedly not by accident, nearly identical to the
language used by Chairman Greenspan and to the
concept articulated earlier by Chairman Volcker.
A second set of bills was introduced by Senator
Connie Mack and Representative Jim Saxton in 1995
and 1997. These bills instructed the Fed to set an
explicit numerical definition of price stability and
to “maintain a monetary policy that effectively
promotes long-term price stability.” Representative
Saxton introduced a significantly revised version
of these bills in 1997 and 1999, mandating price
stability as the “primary goal” of the Federal Reserve
and requiring the Fed to establish an explicit numer-
ical definition of inflation. Senator Mack reintro-
duced his version in 1999.
I interpret these bills as attempts to push the
United States toward a full inflation-targeting regime.
Indeed, the Mack versions would establish an infla-
tion-targeting regime among the strictest in the
world, given that it would have established price
stability as the sole objective of monetary policy,
not simply a hierarchical set of objectives. The
Saxton version is more in line with hierarchical
mandates employed in many inflation-targeting
regimes. These bills were, therefore, vigorously
opposed by advocates of the dual mandate. Perhaps
because these bills formed the backdrop to the
debate in the United States about the policy man-
date, little discussion has taken place on the merits
of moving to an explicit numerical inflation target
in the context of the prevailing dual mandate. Of
course, another explanation for the lack of debate
is that few are unhappy with macroeconomic per-
formance under the current regime.
Mandates in Inflation-Targeting Regimes
New Zealand in 1990 became the first country
to establish a formal inflation-targeting regime.
Canada followed in 1991, the United Kingdom in
1992, and Australia and Sweden in 1993. Subse-
quently, Finland and Spain adopted inflation target-
ing (before becoming members of the European
Monetary Union), and in the last few years several
developing countries have adopted this approach.
Although the European Central Bank (ECB) does
not identify itself as an inflation-targeting regime,
the Maastricht Treaty set price stability as the ECB’s
primary objective and the ECB has set an explicit
numerical target for inflation.
What Is an Inflation-Targeting Regime?
Inflation-targeting regimes generally identify price
stability as the primary objective, usually in the
context of a hierarchical mandate. They set an
explicit numerical target for inflation and set a
period over which any deviation of inflation from
its target is to be eliminated, although some regimes
provide escape clauses and other flexibility related
to the pace of return to price stability.
The inflation target is sometimes set as a point
and sometimes as a range. In most cases, the infla-
tion objective is set for a measure of overall con-
sumer price inflation, the point or midpoint of the
ranges is generally around 2 percent, and the ranges
(where employed) are generally 2 percentage points
wide—typically 1 percent to 3 percent. The time
period prescribed for return to the inflation target
following departures is sometimes explicit and
sometimes not, generally in the range of 18 months
to 2 years. 
Examples of Inflation-Targeting Regimes. In
New Zealand, the first inflation-targeting regime, the
numerical target is set jointly by the Minister of
Finance and the Governor of the central bank and
is currently a range of 0 percent to 3 percent, the
widest of any of the ranges in inflation-targeting
regimes. New Zealand is quite well-known for
establishing performance contracts for government
officials, and this approach is followed in the law
governing the operation of the central bank: The
statute allows the Governor to be dismissed if infla-
tion performance is inadequate.
The Bank of Canada operates under the vaguest
legal mandate among inflation-targeting central
banks. Its statute requires it to regulate “credit and
currency in the best interests of the economic life
of the nation.” Despite the absence of a precise legal
mandate, the details of the Bank’s monetary policy
objectives are reached by agreement between the
Bank and the Department of Finance. This agree-
ment has set price stability as the principal objective
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the agreement sets the range for inflation as 1
percent to 3 percent and identifies the midpoint
as the explicit target.
The Reserve Bank of Australia has a mandate
most closely resembling ours, though it is even
broader and more open-ended. Their legislative
mandate is “to [promote] stability of the currency
of Australia;…[maintain] full employment in
Australia; and…[foster] economic prosperity and
welfare of the people of Australia.” The explicit
inflation target, 2 percent to 3 percent, is set by
the central bank and applies to the average inflation
rate over a business cycle. Although Australia is
counted among inflation-targeting countries, it
has a dual mandate rather than a hierarchical one.
Indeed, it is a model for the combination I prefer:
an explicit inflation target within a dual mandate.
The mandate in the United Kingdom is hierar-
chical. Article 11 of the Bank of England Act sets the
objectives for monetary policy as follows: “to main-
tain price stability” and “subject to that, to support
the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government,
including its objectives for growth and employ-
ment.” The explicit target, set by the Chancellor of
the Exchequer (the equivalent of the Minister of
Finance in many countries or the Secretary of the
Treasury in the United States), is currently 2.5 per-
cent and the target is for retail prices excluding
mortgage interest payments. The Governor of the
Bank of England must write a letter to the Chancellor
if inflation deviates by more than 1 percentage point
from the target.
The ECB does not view itself as an inflation-
targeting central bank. However, the Maastricht
Treaty—the equivalent of the statute establishing
the objectives for a central bank—identifies price
stability as the principal objective in the context of
a hierarchical mandate. Article 105 of the Maastricht
Treaty states that “the primary objective of the
[European System of Central Banks (ESCB)] shall
be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to
the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support
the general economic policies in the community
with a view to contributing to the objectives of the
Community laid down in Article 2.” The objectives
mentioned in Article 2 include “sustainable and
non-inflationary growth,” a “high level of employ-
ment,” and “raising the standard of living” among
member states. The ECB’s Governing Council sets
the explicit numerical inflation target. This is cur-
rently set with an explicit ceiling of 2 percent and
an implicit lower bound of 0 percent. This is the
case of a range rather than a point, with no prefer-
ence stated for the midpoint.
The Evolution of Inflation-Targeting Regimes.
Over their short history, inflation-targeting regimes
have evolved to give central banks greater flexibility
in conducting monetary policy. Mervyn King calls
regimes which take no account of output gaps
(where the coefficient on the output gap is zero in
the loss function) “inflation nutters.”4 That language
suggests that entirely ignoring output stabilization
is now viewed as an extreme position and not as a
desirable option for central banks. Lars Svensson
argues that there has, in fact, been a convergence
toward “flexible inflation targeting”—meaning
inflation-targeting regimes that in practice take into
account deviations in both output and inflation
from their respective targets.5 Such an evolution
has brought many inflation-targeting regimes closer
in practice to a dual mandate regime. 
THE CASE FOR A DUAL MANDATE
The appropriate goals for monetary policy
depend on the structure of the economy and the
preferences of the citizenry. My support for a dual
mandate reflects my views about the structure of
the economy and about the public’s preferences.
These can be summarized as follows:
1. Low and stable inflation (“price stability”) is
essential to good macroeconomic perfor-
mance and hence should be an objective of
macroeconomic policy.
2. The central bank is uniquely responsible for
the inflation rate in the long run.
3. Monetary policy can make some contribution
to lowering the variability of output relative
to potential.
4. The public desires both low and stable infla-
tion and a low variability of output relative
to potential.
The first two points, of course, are shared by
most central bank mandates. The case for the dual
mandate includes the third and fourth points.
Price Stability as a Policy Objective
As I noted at the outset, it is widely agreed that




5 Svensson (1999).of high and variable inflation have been identified.
These costs typically arise from distortions in econ-
omic decisionmaking arising from high or variable
inflation rates and result in lower levels of output
than would otherwise be the case. I won’t elaborate
in detail about these costs here, because I take as a
starting point the agreement that price stability is
an important, if not the singular, objective for mone-
tary policy.6 But the key point is that price stability
is not an end in itself; it is important because it
contributes to a higher level of output and perhaps
faster growth in output.
Monetary Policy and Inflation
Few economists would disagree that inflation
is, as Milton Friedman taught us long ago, always
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. This
was earlier interpreted as a statement about a tight
relationship between money growth (controlled by
the central bank) and inflation. Today, it is recog-
nized that even if the relationship between money
growth and inflation has weakened, perhaps because
of financial innovations, central banks can achieve
their inflation targets by adjusting their preferred
instrument, typically some short-term interest rate.
Hence, monetary policy still determines the rate of
inflation in the long run. While it is also well under-
stood that supply shocks—such as abrupt changes
in the price of energy or food unrelated to the over-
all balance between aggregate demand and supply—
can result in short-run changes in inflation, such
changes in inflation can persist only if central banks
accommodate them. Central banks therefore must
accept full responsibility for inflation in the long
run and have the tools to achieve price stability. 
The Ability to Stabilize Output
While monetary policy can achieve a long-run
inflation target, economic theory suggests that it
cannot affect the level of output or its growth rate
in the long run, other than by maintaining low and
stable inflation. Therefore, the objective of price
stability should be assigned to monetary policy-
makers, but the objective of high and rising living
standards should not be. On the other hand, the
Congress and the Administration have many oppor-
tunities to affect the level and growth in potential
output—including the size of the structural budget
deficit relative to output, the details of the tax code,
and the composition of government spending. 
Whether central banks should accept responsi-
bility for stabilizing output relative to potential is
more controversial. Milton Friedman, for example,
has always questioned the ability of central banks
to stabilize output relative to potential and worried
that attempting to do so could be counterproductive,
given the “long and variable lags” between policy
actions and the economic effects. Economists agree
that monetary policy cannot “fine tune” the econ-
omy to ensure that the full employment objective
is continuously maintained. However, a considerable
amount of research supports the contention that
monetary policy can reduce the variability of output
around its full-employment level.7
Preferences
Households and businesses are presumed to
prefer low and stable inflation to high and variable
inflation. But they also prefer high and rising real
income per capita and output that is consistently
close to the economy’s maximum sustainable level
of output. This is often expressed in terms of a loss
function where the loss to society is expressed as a
weighted average of squared deviations of inflation
from its target and of output from its potential level.
The squaring of the deviations ensures that devia-
tions on either side of the target are treated equiva-
lently as losses.8 The weights, a and 1–a, indicate
the relative intensity of the public’s distaste for
deviation from their preferred rates of inflation and
output. The loss to society, L, can be expressed as 
(1)               L=a(π –π*)
2+(1–a)(y–y*)
2,
where π is the rate of inflation, π* is the target rate
of inflation, y is the level of output, and y* is the
target level of output or potential output.
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7 Much of this research involves simulations of empirical macro-
economic models with alternative policy rules. The simple policy rules
used in these exercises mimic the systematic aspects of the response
of discretionary policy to changes in the macroeconomy. For example,
Taylor has shown that Federal Reserve policy actions in recent years
have been broadly similar to what a simple policy rule would have
prescribed. These exercises therefore demonstrate the ability of
simple rules—and by extension, discretionary monetary policy more
broadly—to both reduce the variability of output and achieve a long-
run inflation target. See Taylor (1999) for a series of papers involving
simulations of models with various policy rules.
8 Squaring the deviations from target values also penalizes larger devia-
tions more than proportionately compared with smaller ones.Tradeoff Between Inflation and Output
Variability
Although it is possible in principle to achieve
price stability and full employment simultaneously,
an inevitable tradeoff between the variability of
output and the variability of inflation exists.9 This
tradeoff is most obvious in the case of a supply
shock, for example an abrupt increase in the price
of oil. An adverse supply shock typically raises
inflation and lowers aggregate demand (by reduc-
ing the purchasing power of consumers), thereby
moving inflation up and output down. This gives
rise to a well-known dilemma for monetary policy:
Should monetary policy ease to reduce the decline
in output or tighten to counter the rise in inflation?
The structure of the economy is such that the quicker
monetary policy tries to return inflation to its target
(to reduce the variability of inflation), the greater
the variability in output.
The choice of a hierarchical versus a dual man-
date may be the most important consideration deter-
mining where a country ends up along this tradeoff.
That is, countries with hierarchical mandates are
more likely to end up with lower inflation variability
at the expense of higher output variability.10 A dual
mandate, therefore, provides flexibility for the
central bank to select the point along this tradeoff
that matches the public’s preference.
Focusing Policymakers on What They
Can Achieve
An argument often made for a hierarchical
mandate is that identifying price stability as the
sole or primary objective focuses monetary policy
on what it can achieve and, thereby, reduces political
pressure to pursue goals that are not achievable. To
be sure, wide agreement exists that central banks
can achieve low and stable inflation and should be
held accountable for doing so. There is also agree-
ment that central banks cannot raise the level or
growth of potential output (other than through
achieving their price stability objective) and should
therefore not be held accountable for these dimen-
sions of macroeconomic performance. But the
public also cares about the variability of output
relative to potential, and the conduct of monetary
policy inevitably will affect output variability. There-
fore, in my view, the importance of keeping mone-
tary policy focused on what it can do supports the
case for a dual mandate that explicitly recognizes
both price stability and output stabilization as objec-
tives for monetary policy.
Is There a Single Long-Run Objective?
It is sometimes argued, however, that price
stability can be the only objective for monetary
policy in the long run, again placing price stability
on a higher plane than full employment. In the long
run, theory holds that the economy gravitates to
full employment by self-equilibrating forces, princi-
pally through the effects of price flexibility. That is,
if the economy is operating at a level of output below
full employment, the price level will tend to fall,
and at least for a given value of the nominal money
supply, this will tend to stimulate aggregate demand.
Over time, this process will raise aggregate demand
to a level consistent with full employment. Hence,
policymakers do not have to be concerned with full
employment in the long run, leaving price stability
as their unique long-run concern.
But this view is misleading in a couple of
respects. First, monetary policymakers should be
concerned about two long-run properties of the
economy. One is price stability and the other is the
variability of output around full employment. Policy
has to be judged by its success in both dimensions.
Second, policy is made in the short run, not the long
run. The speed of return of output to its potential
level is influenced by policy decisions and cannot
be treated with indifference. It may just take too long
and waste too many resources in the interim to rely
on the self-equilibrating forces of the economy.
Policymakers will therefore have to take into account,
in practice, both objectives in their policy actions.
Still, a meaningful difference in the interpreta-
tion of the two objectives remains. A central bank
can achieve the inflation target, with considerable
precision, in the long run, meaning on average over
a period of years. But it cannot be expected to main-
tain the economy continuously at full employment.
The full employment objective might therefore be
better interpreted as an output stabilization objec-
tive. It instructs the central bank to work to reduce
the variability of output around its full employment
level.
The Need for Flexibility
The purpose of a hierarchical mandate is to
impose constraints on the operation of monetary
policy, constraints that proponents believe enhance
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can achieve, and reduce political pressures for
policy to aim at impossible-to-achieve and poten-
tially destabilizing output goals, such as a level of
output above the economy’s maximum sustainable
rate. However, those same constraints might inter-
fere with the pursuit of other legitimate objectives
of monetary policy, specifically with policy adjust-
ments to reduce the variability of output around
potential output.
Most inflation-targeting regimes explicitly recog-
nize that returning inflation to its target too rapidly
following some departure could result in excessive
variability of output. The solution has been to
encourage a gradual return to the inflation target
by explicitly or implicitly setting a policy horizon
over which policymakers commit to return inflation
to its target. Setting fixed horizons for the return to
the inflation target, independent of the size or the
nature of the shock, clearly reduces the flexibility of
monetary policy. To be fair, many regimes explicitly
note that the policy horizons need not be fixed or
include escape clauses that would allow greater
flexibility, for example, in response to a supply
shock. But setting a policy horizon is intended to,
and does, constrain policy responses. It may there-
fore interfere with an appropriate balancing of the
full-employment and price-stability goals. This is
especially the case if the mandate is hierarchical,
where other objectives can be pursued only if the
inflation objective is achieved.
The Taylor Rule and the Dual Mandate
The Taylor rule is a useful characterization of
U.S. monetary policy.11 According to the Taylor rule,
monetary policymakers should adjust the target for
the short-term interest rate in response to deviations
of output and inflation from their respective targets
and in response to changes in inflation. It is there-
fore well aligned with a dual mandate. The Taylor
rule can be written as
(2)          R=r*+π+c[(y/y*)–1]+d(π –π*),
where R is the target nominal policy rate, r*is the
equilibrium real level of the policy rate (consistent
with price stability and full employment), y is output,
y*is the level of potential output, π is inflation, π*
is the target for inflation, and c and d are the param-
eters that describe the response of the policy rate
to deviations of output and inflation from their
respective targets.
The Taylor rule is consistent with the loss func-
tion described in equation (1) because the rule
prescribes an adjustment of the federal funds rate
in response to the deviations from target values that
are presumed to give rise to costs to society. The
Taylor rule also helps to make the point that policy-
makers can operate with an output stabilization
goal and still ensure that inflation is, on average,
consistent with the inflation target in the long run.12
A strict version of inflation targeting would be
one based on a loss function, taking into account
only losses associated with inflation deviating from
its target. In terms of equation (1), that would mean
that a=0—that is, no costs were associated with
deviation of output from its potential level. Based
on a simple model, we could derive an optimal
policy response to shocks, based on this loss func-
tion and the more general one where costs are
assigned to deviations from both price stability and
full employment. If policy is set assuming a=0 (as
would be the case in a very strict inflation-targeting
regime), it is clear that policy will be suboptimal if
the true loss function does assign a cost to deviating
from full employment.13
The more difficult question is: How suboptimal
are inflation-targeting regimes that recognize the
costs of excessive output variability, but nevertheless
constrain monetary policymakers from responding
to deviations of output from its target, except when
the inflation target has already been met or when
policymakers can project that it will be met in a
reasonable period? In my view, such regimes are
likely to remain suboptimal, compared with a more
flexible dual-mandate regime.
Transparency, Accountability, and the
Dual Mandate
As I noted, transparency about monetary policy
requires a full and accurate account of the objec-
tives. But pretending that inflation is the only objec-
tive, while taking account of output variability in
practice, only makes for less-transparent policy and
ensures that the central bank will have difficulty
communicating the rationale for its policy actions.
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001      7
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
11 Taylor (1993).
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as the sole objective. In this case, the output gap terms would be viewed
as a predictor of inflation, allowing policymakers to take preemptive
action to contain the threat of higher inflation, in addition to directly
responding to higher inflation itself.
13 See Kim and Henderson (2000).I remember the first conference I attended after
joining the Board of Governors. Two foreign central
bankers—each from inflation-targeting countries—
lectured me about how “good” central bankers acted
in public. They each told me that a disciplined
central banker would never admit to having a stabi-
lization objective and never admit that there was a
cost of lowering inflation. Such admissions, they
warned, would only undermine the public’s confi-
dence in a central banker’s commitment to price
stability. I responded that this lesson in central bank-
ing surprised me. I would not have thought obfuscat-
ing about policy objectives or the way monetary
policy affects the economy would have enhanced
the credibility of a policymaker. I still don’t.
THE CASE FOR AN EXPLICIT 
INFLATION TARGET
An explicit inflation target would, in my view,
give added precision to an already mandated objec-
tive. Three of the arguments for inflation-targeting
regimes, it seems to me, also support an explicit
inflation target within a dual mandate. First, an
explicit inflation target would improve the trans-
parency and accountability of monetary policy.
Second, it might help, at the margin, to anchor
inflation expectations. Third, it would help to insti-
tutionalize recent good monetary policy. It would
also, in my view, make the decisionmaking process
more coherent. Indeed, moving in this direction
would extract most of the benefits of an inflation-
targeting regime without suffering the loss of flexi-
bility inherent in its hierarchical mandate.
Improving Transparency and
Accountability
Transparency is an important goal for monetary
policymakers for two reasons. First, a more trans-
parent policy may be a more effective one. Monetary
policy works both through the setting of a target
short-term nominal interest rate and by the expec-
tations policymakers induce in the markets, wittingly
or unwittingly, about the course of future policy. To
the extent that market participants correctly antici-
pate future policy moves, long-term interest rates
will move in response to expectations of future
moves in short-term rates, in effect, speeding the
response of aggregate demand to monetary policy.
Second, central bank independence has to be bal-
anced by accountability. More precise goals increase
both the transparency and the accountability of
monetary policy.
Anchoring Inflation Expectations and
Increasing Credibility
Anchoring inflation expectations at the targeted
rate of inflation is an important goal for monetary
policy. However, whether an explicit inflation target
or a formal inflation-targeting regime would boost
the credibility of the central bank’s commitment to
price stability is more debatable. In my judgment,
credibility is primarily earned by performance. In
addition, there is little empirical evidence to sug-
gest that either explicit inflation targets or inflation-
targeting regimes lower the cost of disinflation by
directly lowering inflation expectations. Still, at the
margin, such a target might enhance the ability of
the Fed to anchor inflation expectations and perhaps
also enhance the ability of the Fed to pursue its sta-
bilization objective without undermining the public’s
confidence in its commitment to low inflation.
Institutionalizing Good Monetary
Policy
Most observers would rate monetary policy in
the United States over the last two decades as very
good. Good policy, in turn, depends on the combi-
nation of a well-defined mandate, a disciplined
strategy for achieving the mandate, and the quality
of the FOMC and its staff working to implement
the strategy. The Chairman has considerable influ-
ence over the policy outcome, disproportionate to
the one vote he or she casts, so that the quality of
the chairman is especially important. The Federal
Reserve has been fortunate to have strong leadership
for many years under both Paul Volcker and Alan
Greenspan. A more fully articulated mandate could
help ensure that policy remains well focused and
disciplined as the leadership of the Fed changes.
Facilitating the Policymaking Process
The Fed staff routinely shows policymakers the
prescriptions from several Taylor-rule-type policy
reaction functions, and such a rule is explicitly
incorporated into the Fed’s large-scale model used
for policy analysis. The staff has never asked FOMC
members about their preferences for a numerical
inflation target and instead often employs the target
that John Taylor used in the policy rule he intro-
duced in 1993. I have great regard for John, but this
seems to be a rather unusual way for a policy rule
to be run at the Fed.
More important, if the target is implicit, and
8 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001
REVIEWtherefore imprecise, members of the FOMC inevit-
ably will each make policy decisions in pursuit of
different inflation targets. It seems to me that the
internal discussion of policy would be more coherent
if policymakers agreed in advance on an inflation
objective. There would still be differences in policy
preferences at FOMC meetings due, for example, to
different views about the economic outlook, differ-
ent views about the structure of the economy, and
different views about the sustainable level of the
unemployment rate or the maximum sustainable
rate of growth in output. But, provided that all FOMC
members agreed to seek the objective chosen by the
majority, an explicit target would prevent members
from pulling in different directions because of differ-
ent inflation objectives.
Retaining Flexibility with the Dual
Mandate
The key issue for me is whether setting an
explicit inflation target would reduce the flexibility
of policymakers to pursue a dual mandate and select
the preferred point along the tradeoff between out-
put and inflation variability. That is, would making
the p* in the Taylor rule explicit inevitably also lead
to a change in the relative responses to deviations
from the output and inflation targets (the c and d
parameters in equation (2))? Specifically, would
implementing an explicit inflation target inevitably
also raise the response parameter on the inflation
gap relative to that on the output gap? In my view,
the answer is that this need not be the case, but I
agree that there is some risk of this outcome. It
seems to me, however, that it is less likely if the move
to an explicit inflation target is taken in the context
of a reaffirmation of the dual mandate.
If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It
As I noted above, most observers believe that
monetary policy has been excellent in recent years.
Why, then, change the underlying framework for
policy, especially when this change is not likely to
have much of an influence on the conduct of mone-
tary policy?
The case for moving to an explicit inflation
target within our current dual mandate is that it
extracts most of the potential benefits of inflation-
targeting regimes without necessarily reducing the
flexibility of policy. I believe that the Fed remains
more responsive to deviations of output from its
target than most inflation-targeting central banks,
even allowing for the convergence that has been
under way. I believe we could retain that flexibility
with an explicit inflation target because of our his-
torical commitment to a dual mandate and because
there would be no presumption that the fundamen-
tal strategy for conducting monetary policy, sum-
marized by the Taylor rule, would change. At the
same time, I believe transparency and accountability
are appropriate goals for monetary policymakers
and that an explicit inflation target would contribute
to each of these goals, even if it would not have had
much effect on the actual course of policy in recent
years.
Should the Full Employment Objective
Be Explicit Also?
A natural question in the case of a dual mandate
is whether both objectives should be made explicit.
Some members of the Congress, for example, might
encourage the Fed to adopt an explicit objective for
full employment to balance an explicit inflation
objective. Although I support an explicit objective
for inflation, it would not be constructive, in my
view, to set an explicit numerical target for full
employment.
The central bank is capable of achieving an
inflation objective, at least on average over a period
of years. In contrast, if we define full employment
in terms of a threshold for the unemployment rate
consistent with maximum sustainable employment,
the central bank has no choice about what this
threshold should be.14 It is determined by the struc-
ture of the economy, including the effectiveness of
institutions and markets in matching vacancies and
unemployed workers, and by policies, such as the
levels of unemployment compensation and mini-
mum wage rates.
Because institutions and markets evolve and
labor market policies change, it would be inappro-
priate to set a fixed numerical objective for full
employment. That does not rule out central banks
being more transparent about their estimate of the
unemployment rate that is consistent with maxi-
mum sustainable employment, though no central
bank has ventured into this territory. That is perhaps
not surprising. Indeed, it would be difficult to do so
because there is considerable debate—both inside
and outside central banks—about the usefulness of
a “full employment rate of unemployment” as a
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14 This threshold is often referred to as the non-accelerating inflation
rate of unemployment or the NAIRU.guide to policy and, even among those who believe
this is an important and useful concept, about what
that rate may be today and how it tends to change
over time. So the issue here is not simply one of
transparency and accountability.
In addition, political considerations may be at
work. At times, an increase in the unemployment
rate may be required to sustain stable, low inflation.
Rare is the leader of a monetary policy committee
who relishes going to the legislature and reporting
that the central bank is concerned that too many
people have jobs.
The uncertainty about the threshold unemploy-
ment rate also suggests a differing degree of inten-
sity in the response of monetary policy to deviations
of inflation and output to their respective targets.
That uncertainty derives from our inability to pre-
cisely pin down two key parameters—the threshold
unemployment rate and the trend rate of growth in
potential output. As a result, there is a subtle differ-
ence between the two objectives in the dual mandate.
One objective—price stability—can be well defined
and is fully under the control of monetary policy-
makers, at least over a period of time. The other—
full employment—is set by the structure of the
economy, not policymakers, and cannot be precisely
pinned down numerically at any point in time and
can vary over time.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Let us now assume that a decision has been
made to move to an explicit inflation target. Several
steps would be required to implement such a deci-
sion. First, we would have to decide who would set
the explicit target. Second, a specific price index
would have to be selected to serve as the basis for
the inflation target. Third, we would have to decide
whether the target should be a point or a range.
Fourth, we would have to decide on the level of the
point or the values that establish the range.
Who Should Set the Inflation Target?
Among inflation-targeting regimes, there is a mix
of practices with respect to who sets the numerical
target for inflation. In almost all cases, the govern-
ment identifies price stability as a target, either as
the single target or as part of a hierarchical mandate.
In about half the cases, the explicit numerical target
for inflation is set by the government, typically the
finance ministry, generally in consultation with the
central bank; in about half the cases, the target is
set by the central bank, often in consultation with
the finance ministry.
The United States already has a mandate that
includes price stability. The existing law therefore
seems to be compatible with the Federal Reserve
setting an explicit numerical inflation rate consistent
with the notion of price stability. Thus, the FOMC
could move in this direction without any amend-
ment to the Federal Reserve Act. Perhaps the setting
of an explicit inflation target by the Federal Reserve
might be analogous to its earlier setting of numeri-
cal money growth ranges. In 1978, the Congress
instructed the Fed to report an objective for money
growth. The FOMC then decided unilaterally on the
numerical ranges. In 2000, the Congress amended
the Federal Reserve Act to remove the requirement
that the Fed report to the Congress on the ranges
for monetary aggregates. In the case of an inflation
objective, the Congress has already imposed a price-
stability objective. All the FOMC would be doing is
communicating back to the Congress and the public
its interpretation of that objective.
Nevertheless, such a move would likely be inter-
preted as an important change in the conduct of
monetary policy. Consequently, if the FOMC desired
to move in this direction, extensive prior consulta-
tions would be appropriate, especially with the
Congress, but also with the Administration. It might
also be constructive to get feedback from a wider
audience on a proposal to set an explicit inflation
target before proceeding in this direction.
It would, however, be problematic for the United
States to follow the approach in many inflation-
targeting countries of having the ministry of finance
(in our case, the Treasury Department) set the infla-
tion target. Such an approach is more comfortable
politically in a parliamentary system, in which the
legislative and executive branches are always con-
trolled by the same party or coalition. It seems
unlikely that the Congress would delegate this
responsibility to the Treasury Department. Even
regular consultation with the Treasury Department
about a specific goal under the approach I have
mentioned here might raise questions unless the
Congress explicitly authorized it.
Choosing a Specific Price Index
Most broad measures of inflation move roughly
in concert over time. Nevertheless, the differentials
among the most widely used aggregate measures of
inflation generally are not stable over long periods.
Therefore, it does make some difference which
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targeting central banks use a measure of consumer
price inflation for their target. In the absence of a
complete model of the cost of inflation to guide the
choice, the use of consumer price measures seems
appropriate because these measures are the most
relevant to the calculation of real income for house-
holds, because the welfare of households is ulti-
mately the goal for monetary policy, and because
measures of consumer price inflation are often the
most visible of inflation measures.
In the United States, this would mean a choice
between the consumer price index (CPI) and the
price index for personal consumption expenditures.
The CPI is the most widely recognized measure of
consumer price inflation, but the Federal Reserve
has expressed the view that the measure based on
personal consumption expenditures has advantages
as a measure of trends in consumer price inflation.
Setting the inflation rate in terms of the price index
for personal consumption expenditures would further
elevate this measure in the public consciousness.
A related decision is whether to set the target in
terms of overall inflation or in terms of core infla-
tion—that is, consumer price inflation net of the
direct influence of movements in energy and food
prices, which tend to be volatile. Focusing on core
inflation might increase the likelihood that mone-
tary policy would respond to underlying inflation
developments that promised to be persistent, and
not on transitory changes in inflation. Nevertheless,
most inflation-targeting regimes set their explicit
inflation target in terms of overall inflation. As long
as policy is focused on achieving a longer-run infla-
tion outcome, as opposed to meeting the target each
quarter or even each year, a target for overall infla-
tion can work well because swings in energy and
food prices that lead to shorter-run inflation blips
tend to dissipate or wash out over longer periods.
In this case, it would also be useful, as is the practice
at some inflation-targeting central banks, to monitor
movements in core inflation as a guide to whether
current monetary policy is well aligned with the
longer-term objective for overall inflation. Weigh-
ing the pros and cons, policy might be better and
the communication to the public might be most
clear if the target itself was expressed in terms of
the core inflation rate.
Point or Range
Practice differs among inflation-targeting central
banks, with about half setting their targets as points
and the other half as ranges. Among those who
adopt ranges, some also identify the midpoint of
the range as the specific target. I prefer a point target.
This provides a more precise anchor for inflation
expectations and a more specific target for mone-
tary policymakers. If a range is selected, questions
will arise about the differing implications of move-
ments of inflation inside the range and outside the
range and, in the absence of explicitly identifying
the mid-point as the target, about where within the
range policymakers would prefer inflation to gravi-
tate. If there is indifference about movements inside
the range, this will tilt policy toward allowing greater
variability of inflation.
What Level?
If the objective is price stability, this may seem
like a pointless question. But it is an important issue
for two reasons. First, assuming that the official
indexes are biased upward, true price stability will
be achieved at some positive rate for measured
inflation. Second, there are considerations that favor
allowing some small positive rate of true inflation,
rather than true price stability.
In 1995, the Boskin Commission estimated that
the measurement bias for the CPI was between 0.8
and 1.6 percentage points. Since then, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics has made a series of methodological
improvements in the CPI, lowering the bias. In 1999,
the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the
cumulative effects of these improvements had been
to reduce the measurement error to a point estimate
of 0.8 percent. Therefore, in terms of the CPI, if this
were the only consideration, the target could be set
at 1 percent to allow for measurement error (and
also a round number). This also suggests that the
target should not be fixed in time, but should be
adjusted over time to take into account changes in
the estimated bias.
There are a couple of reasons to consider setting
an inflation target above the level consistent with
true price stability. If there is resistance to declines
in nominal wages, a small amount of wage inflation
may enhance the flexibility of real wages and facil-
itate the movement to equilibrium in the labor mar-
ket.15 Whether this requires positive price inflation
will depend on the variance of the wage changes,
the degree of nominal wage rigidity, and the rate of
growth of labor productivity. In addition, a positive
rate of inflation increases the flexibility of mone-
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001      11
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
15 See Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1966).tary policy by allowing policymakers to drive real
interest rates below zero. Particularly in light of the
latter consideration, I would set the inflation target
at what I refer to as true price stability plus a small
cushion. Specifically, for the CPI, I would set it at 2
percent, 1 percentage point for the measurement
error and 1 percentage point for the cushion.16 This
would correspond roughly to a 1.5 percent inflation
rate for the price index for personal consumption
expenditures, based on recent differentials of this
measure relative to the inflation rate for the CPI.
The precise magnitude of the cushion should also
be subject to adjustment over time to reflect ongoing
research about its optimal size.
Time Horizon
There should be no fixed time horizon for
returning inflation to its target when deviations
occur. Such a horizon would be arbitrary, in some
cases might not be credible, and potentially would
constrain the ability of the FOMC to pursue the dual
mandate. On the other hand, it would be useful to
use a measure for inflation that smoothes over
transient shocks and that is not subject to potential
problems with seasonal adjustment. For that reason,
I would favor a year-over-year measure of the infla-
tion rate—for example, a 12-month CPI or price
index for personal consumption expenditures—for
evaluating performance relative to the target.
CONCLUSION
It is widely agreed that price stability is an impor-
tant objective of monetary policy and that central
banks should be held responsible for that objective.
That said, central banks differ over whether they
should set an explicit inflation target and whether
they should acknowledge and take responsibility
for other objectives, specifically full employment
or output stabilization.
An explicit inflation target would give added
precision to an already mandated objective and
would thereby improve the transparency of and
accountability for monetary policy. Moving to an
explicit inflation target would, in my view, be consis-
tent with the current statute governing the objec-
tives of monetary policy in the United States and
would, in turn, require no fundamental change in
the current Federal Reserve strategy for implement-
ing monetary policy.
The most important question that has to be
addressed in order to assess the costs and benefits
of a move in this direction is whether it could be
accomplished without reducing the flexibility the
Fed now has to pursue a dual mandate. In my view,
if the explicit mandate is set in the context of a
reaffirmation of the dual mandate, the flexibility
now enjoyed by U.S. monetary policy will likely be
maintained. A second question is whether moving
in this direction would matter much for the conduct
of monetary policy in the United States. I believe the
answer to that question is that it would not matter
much today, with the current Chairman and the
current FOMC. But moving in this direction would
provide some greater assurance of continuity in
policy. In addition, it would have the virtue of
enhancing transparency and accountability.
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